On September 24, 2026, the Third District Court of Appeal issued a per curiam affirmance in Valencia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Ken Edgecombe, No. 3D25-0088, an appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County. The opinion is two pages. Its holding is a single word: “Affirmed.” But the panel did not affirm silently. It hung its decision on Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c)(6) and one italicized word, and pointed to the Second District’s reasoning in Covey v. Shaffer to explain why.
The reason to read it is not the underlying facts, which the panel does not recount. The reason is that the Third District is telling the trial bar something about the scheduling rule for summary judgment hearings that is worth the two pages it took to say it.
The Opinion in Full
The panel (Judges Fernandez, Gordo, and Gooden) affirmed, citing:
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)(6) (“Any hearing on a motion for summary judgment must be set for a date at least 10 days after the deadline for serving a response, unless the parties stipulate or the court orders otherwise.”) (emphasis added); cf. Covey v. Shaffer, 277 So. 3d 694, 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (“The use of the definite article ‘the’ in lieu of an indefinite article such as ‘a’ or ‘any’ indicates that the statute has a particular hearing in mind, i.e., the hearing for which the petitioner is required to serve notice, rather than merely a possible, optional hearing.”).
That is the entire body of the opinion. The italics on “Any” are the panel’s.
What Rule 1.510(c)(6) Actually Requires
Rule 1.510(c)(6), part of the 2021 rewrite that brought Florida’s summary judgment procedure into line with the federal standard, contains four moving parts:
- Trigger. A hearing on a motion for summary judgment.
- Cushion. The hearing must be set for a date at least ten days after the deadline for serving a response to the motion.
- Sweep. The rule applies to any such hearing, not the first one, not a particular one, but any one.
- Escape valves. The parties may stipulate to a shorter interval, or the court may order otherwise.
The response-service deadline under Rule 1.510(c)(5) is at least 60 days after the motion is served or 20 days before the hearing, whichever is earlier. The ten-day cushion in subsection (c)(6) is therefore layered on top of that timing structure. It is not a duplicate of the notice rule. It is a floor on how quickly the court can hear the motion after the responding party’s deadline runs.
Why the Italics on “Any” Matter
Rulemakers make word choices for reasons, and reviewing courts read those choices as if they do. The Third District’s italicization of “Any” is doing textual-canon work: the drafters chose the indefinite universal quantifier rather than the definite article, and that choice reaches every hearing on a summary judgment motion. It applies whether the hearing is the first setting, a resetting after a continuance, a hearing after supplementation or amendment, or a hearing on a renewed or successor motion. Wherever the rule’s trigger fires, the ten-day cushion fires with it.
That is where Covey v. Shaffer earns its cf. citation. Covey read the statutory phrase “the hearing” in a Baker Act context and concluded that the definite article “the” pointed to a particular, identified hearing rather than an open-ended class of possible hearings. Here, the drafters did the opposite: they wrote “any hearing.” The Third District is signaling that the same interpretive move used in Covey to narrow “the” should be used, in reverse, to broaden “any.” The rule reaches every summary judgment hearing that occurs in a case, not just the initial setting.
Read that way, the affirmance in Valencia answers, at least implicitly, an argument that has surfaced in trial courts across the state since the 2021 rewrite: whether a reset, rescheduled, or successor summary judgment hearing needs its own ten-day cushion, or whether the movant may piggyback on the earlier notice. The answer, on the Third District’s reading of subsection (c)(6), is that each hearing carries its own cushion unless the parties stipulate or the court orders otherwise.
Practice Pointers
- Calendar the ten-day cushion from the response deadline every time a summary judgment hearing is set or reset. Not from the motion date. Not from the notice date. From the deadline to serve a response. If the hearing lands inside that window, it is presumptively noncompliant unless a stipulation or court order says otherwise.
- Object on the record, and do it early. A party who appears at a hearing set inside the ten-day cushion, argues the merits, and only complains later has a hard argument on appeal. Raise the timing objection in a written notice, motion to reset, or opening remarks. Ask the court to reset the hearing or, in the alternative, to make an on-the-record finding under the “the court orders otherwise” clause.
- Use the stipulation escape valve with care. Rule 1.510(c)(6) allows the parties to stipulate around the ten-day cushion. A stipulation should say so explicitly, identify the specific hearing it covers, and be filed. A hallway agreement is not a stipulation.
- Draft “court orders otherwise” findings deliberately. When a court accelerates a summary judgment hearing under exigent circumstances, the order should say the court is doing so under Rule 1.510(c)(6), identify the reason, and address any prejudice to the responding party. A silent record on why the ten-day cushion was compressed is the kind of record that invites reversal.
- Do not assume a reset resets nothing. After a continuance, an amended motion, a supplementation, or a successor motion, treat the new hearing as its own event. Confirm the response deadline for the operative motion, run the ten-day cushion from that deadline, and re-notice accordingly.
- Preserve the issue in writing. If the trial court declines to reset, memorialize the objection and the court’s ruling in a written filing, a proposed order, or on the transcript. A three-word italicized emphasis from the Third District is enough to draw the panel’s eye, but only if the record shows the issue was raised below.
The Bottom Line
The Third District affirmed. The trial court got the timing right. The panel took the extra step of quoting Rule 1.510(c)(6), italicizing “Any,” and pointing to Covey to underscore that the drafters’ word choice was not accidental. Practitioners on both sides of a summary judgment motion should read the opinion as a directive: run the ten-day cushion from the response deadline for every summary judgment hearing, first or otherwise, unless the parties or the court have expressly said otherwise on the record.