In the span of about three months, three Florida businesses allege that criminals took over their accounts at the same bank and drained more than $24 million through wire transfers. In two of the cases, the impostors allegedly talked their way past the bank’s own help desk with the same story. Two of the victims are South Florida law firms. The bank in each case is First Horizon Bank.

When a business discovers that its operating or trust account has been emptied by fraudulent wires, the first question is usually whether the bank has to put the money back. Suing a bank over wire fraud is hard because the law is built in a way that protects the bank. But when the same scheme hits the same bank again and again, the argument that the bank should bear the loss gets much stronger. The recent First Horizon lawsuits show why.

Why it is so hard to sue a bank over wire fraud

Most people assume a bank that sends money on a criminal’s instructions is automatically responsible. It is not that simple. Business wire transfers in Florida are governed by Chapter 670 of the Florida Statutes, Florida’s version of Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code. That framework was written to make wire transfers fast and predictable, and it allocates risk in ways that can leave a defrauded customer holding the loss.

A few features make these cases an uphill climb:

None of this means victims cannot recover. It means the outcome usually turns on details: what security procedure was actually agreed to, whether it was reasonable, and whether the bank really followed it.

The lawsuits against First Horizon

The two most detailed complaints describe nearly identical attacks. Everything below is an allegation that has not been proven, and First Horizon disputes the claims.

Rabideau Klein, P.A. (Palm Beach). The law firm alleges that on January 27, 2026, a phishing email gave an attacker access to one of its email accounts. The next day, the attacker had the firm’s phone lines forwarded to his own number, used the bank’s online “Forgot User ID or Password” tool, which displayed the firm partner’s user ID, and then called First Horizon. He said he had a new iPhone and needed a new RSA security token. According to the complaint, he referred to the firm’s account as “their” account number, gave a business name that did not match the bank’s records, and asked that the verification code be delivered by voice call rather than text. The bank issued the token.

Overnight, the attacker reset passwords, created a new user ID, disabled four legitimate users, and sent 14 wires in round numbers, including the firm’s first-ever wires to China and Mexico. The bank blocked one and released 13, totaling about $17.28 million out of an attorney trust account holding real estate escrow funds. About $10.7 million was recovered. The firm sued in Palm Beach County circuit court on June 10, 2026, for roughly $6.55 million plus interest and damages, and the case was later removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

K&A Rosario Holdings and MJR Fund (Orlando). On March 3, 2026, a caller claiming to be the companies’ principal, Misael Rosario, phoned First Horizon from a California number that was not on file. He mispronounced Rosario’s first name and said he needed to update his token because he “got a new iPhone 14.” The bank verified him with a name spelling, an email address, and the last four digits of a phone number, all of which the complaint says are publicly available. Within about 30 minutes, six wire requests totaling $4,850,700 came out of an account that had made no withdrawals in six months. By March 5, wires totaling $6,517,700 had been sent, and the bank’s first notice to the customer was an email at 1:13 a.m. More than $4.5 million remains unreimbursed. Four of those wires, totaling $2.29 million, went to Shaoxing Fanshun Import and Export, the same company that received wires in the Rabideau Klein attack.

Case Date of attack Alleged loss Still outstanding Court
K&A Rosario Holdings / MJR Fund I v. First Horizon March 3 to 5, 2026 $6,517,700 $4,585,257.81 U.S. District Court, M.D. Fla. (Orlando)
Rabideau Klein, P.A. v. First Horizon January 28 to 29, 2026 $17,276,700 about $6,546,770 Filed Palm Beach County; removed to U.S. District Court, S.D. Fla.
Nosich & Ganz v. First Horizon December 2025 about $604,500 Not stated Filed Miami-Dade County; removed to U.S. District Court, S.D. Fla.

The Rosario plaintiffs also allege that after the fraud, First Horizon froze their unaffected accounts and asked Mr. Rosario directly, without copying his lawyers, to sign a broad release of “any and all known or unknown claims” before access would be restored.

First Horizon’s position deserves equal space. The bank has said that in the Rabideau Klein matter its “systems, controls and protections functioned appropriately.” It points to the firm’s email being phished and to an enrollment form on which the firm opted out of dual approval for wires, which the bank says it recommended. In the Rosario case, the bank has moved to partially dismiss, arguing the contract claim should go and that references to other customers’ incidents should be struck as “immaterial and impertinent.”

What else is happening in South Florida

The Palm Beach and Orlando cases are not isolated. Miami law firm Nosich & Ganz sued First Horizon in Miami-Dade County circuit court on March 27, 2026, and the bank removed the case to the Southern District of Florida on May 29, 2026 (docket). The firm alleges that on December 2, 2025, fraudsters posing as First Horizon persuaded a firm employee to read back a temporary authentication code, then logged in from an unrecognized IP address and, within minutes, sent wires to 13 beneficiaries the firm had never paid, including about $200,000 drawn from the firm’s line of credit. The loss totaled about $604,500.

The scheme was different from the help-desk calls in the later cases, but the firm raises related complaints. It alleges that First Horizon’s platform requires dual authorization for wires by default, that the firm never opted out, and that the bank nonetheless processed the wires without it. It also alleges that a bank officer called about the activity around 2:30 p.m. that day, yet processing continued and the bank did not contact the receiving banks until the end of the day, during the window when recalls are most likely to work. The firm sued under sections 670.202 and 670.204 and for negligence and unjust enrichment, and First Horizon has moved to dismiss.

The Rosario complaint ties that incident to the others. It alleges that around December 2, 2025, an unrecognized IP address logged into a First Horizon customer’s online account and sent multiple wire requests within minutes to unknown recipients, and that the bank learned of it in early January 2026. Taken together, the three Florida suits allege more than $24 million in fraudulent wires between December 2025 and March 2026 (PR Newswire).

The Rabideau Klein complaint also points to earlier history. It cites a 2021 SEC filing in which First Horizon’s parent disclosed that an unauthorized party used stolen credentials to access fewer than 200 online accounts, and a September 2025 Federal Reserve prohibition order against a former First Horizon wire transfer administrator who allegedly passed confidential customer information to a third party who impersonated customers and initiated fraudulent wires. It further alleges that in February 2026 a bank employee emailed a spreadsheet of roughly 4,000 rows of customer data, including user IDs, account numbers, and balances, to a Florida attorney.

The coverage has spread well beyond Florida, including American Banker, The Real Deal, and WSOC-TV. As the Rosario plaintiffs’ counsel put it to WSOC: “Nothing changed. First Horizon fell to the same trick to the same recipients.”

Why a repeated scheme should change the analysis

Wire fraud law asks whether a bank’s security procedure was commercially reasonable and whether the bank acted in good faith, which the complaints describe as honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. Under section 670.202(3), commercial reasonableness is a question of law for the court, decided by looking at the customer’s wishes, the circumstances of the customer known to the bank (including the size, type, and frequency of its usual payment orders), the alternatives the bank offered, and the security procedures in general use by similar customers and banks. And the bank, not the customer, has to prove it acted in good faith and followed the procedure. These are not frozen, one-time questions. A procedure that looks reasonable on paper can stop being reasonable once the bank has watched criminals defeat it.

That is the core of the accountability argument. After a first attack, a bank can fairly say it was blindsided. After a second or third attack using the same script, the picture changes:

  1. The bank knows the playbook. By January 29, 2026, according to the Rosario complaint, First Horizon knew that a caller claiming a “new iPhone” had obtained a token and sent millions to Shaoxing Fanshun. Five weeks later, the same excuse allegedly worked again, and money went to the same recipient.
  2. The fix is not exotic. Verifying a caller with nonpublic information, calling back a number already on file, pausing a token reissue that is followed within minutes by large first-time international wires, or flagging a known fraudulent beneficiary are ordinary precautions. Florida’s statute itself lists callback procedures among the tools a security procedure may use. Whether they were required is an open question in these cases, but a court weighing what was commercially reasonable may fairly ask why they were not in place.
  3. Only the bank sees the pattern. Each customer sees only its own account. The bank sees every account, every repeat beneficiary, and every help desk call. The party with that view is in the best position to stop the next loss.
  4. Good faith is measured against what the bank knows. It is difficult to square “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing” with continuing to accept a scheme the bank has already identified as fraud.

This is also why First Horizon’s motion to strike references to other customers’ incidents matters. If a court treats each attack as a separate event and excludes the history, the repetition, which is the most telling fact, may never reach a jury. How the courts handle that question will shape whether banks face real consequences for failing to adapt.

The counterpoint is real too. Customers have security duties of their own. Phished email accounts, forwarded phone lines, and declined safeguards like dual approval all give a bank arguments that the customer shares or bears the loss. Accountability should run both ways. But the bank’s obligations should grow with what it knows, and a bank that has been beaten by the same trick before should be held to that knowledge.

If your business has been hit

Time matters more than anything else. In the Rabideau Klein and Rosario cases, fast reporting helped recover millions.

  1. Call the bank’s fraud line immediately and ask for a recall of every wire, then confirm in writing.
  2. Report to law enforcement, including the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3).
  3. Preserve everything: emails, call logs, phone carrier records, login alerts, and the bank’s notices.
  4. Get your account agreements, including the treasury management agreement and any enrollment or opt-out forms you signed.
  5. Do not sign a release to regain access to your accounts until a lawyer has reviewed it.
  6. Calendar the notice deadlines. The wire-transfer statute and your agreement may set short windows to object.

Black Law P.A. handles complex commercial disputes, including claims against financial institutions, across South Florida and the state. If your business has lost money to a fraudulent wire, please reach out to discuss your options.

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